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Populism and religious freedom share multiple connections. This blog post explores one particular aspect that might initially seem distantly related to the security of places of worship. Specifically, it examines the populists' seemingly unjustified preoccupation with the right to freedom of speech. While on the surface, this connection might appear tenuous, delving deeper reveals its significance in the broader context of religious freedom and societal harmony. The Populist Paradox The fight over freedom of speech plays a central role in the resulting rift of populism rising and clashing with established social and political institutions. A general critique herein is that populist movements advertise themselves as the propagation vessels of freedom of speech, whilst in reality only pursuing freedom of speech specifically for their clique.[i][ii] Contrastingly enough, when populist movements gain real political power, restricting the freedom of speech for others tends to be a priority under the vain of protecting a national culture or identity.[iii] Simultaneously, populist movements feverishly denounce critiques of their inflammatory views and statements of populist movements through claims that the elite establishment and media agencies working for them are seeking to silence their supposedly commonly held beliefs. These claims are argued to be legitimately expressed through an absolute right to freedom of speech. However, this represents a misunderstanding of freedom of speech, supposedly entailing the right to say or express oneself in whatever manner chosen, no matter how offensive or provocative. This misunderstanding of the right to freedom of speech by populist movements around the world is an intentional one with the sole objective of riling up individuals behind their political agenda.[iv] Freedom of speech, despite being a fundamental right, is not an absolute one nor has it ever been. This is not a controversial assertion; most fundamental rights come with some form of limitation. Simply put, a society without restrictions on freedom of speech would be a society without copyright or legal remedy against defamation.[v] Whilst ongoing debate on thought-matter or practices of any community – religious or otherwise - should be possible and is currently possible, this debate on the position of religion in a secular world should not temporarily suspend constitutional rights for other parts of society, in this case, religious communities. The populist claim over freedom of speech has created a rather interesting dynamic, one with real consequences for the accessibility and safety of places of worship. Freedom of Speech and Places of Worship Researchers of the EU-financed PARTES project ("Participatory approaches to protecting places of worship" - more information here) interviewed representatives and stakeholders from different religious communities and places of worship in Europe. In the interviews conducted with representatives of a wide array of different places of worship in the Netherlands, for instance, one answer was consistently given to the question of what constituted the main threat to the accessibility of places of worship: the apparent expansion of the interpretation of freedom of speech beyond its intended meaning. Although a debate on the defnition of acceptable behaviour in a society is in itself valuable and important (such as if throwing a pig head against a Mosque should be allowed or not), it nonetheless creates an insecure environment for religious communities. Due to the fact that any debate on the limits of freedom of speech is highly contentious in nature and violence against religious communities may not be severely widespread at a certain point in time, public authorities may appear indifferent or unwilling to clearly define red lines that cannot be crossed. It was also highlighted during the conducted interviews that the different religious communities in The Netherlands peacefully and respectfully coexist with one another. However, if one community started to actively provoke or harass members of another, there would be public outcry and a likely intervention by authorities. However, it may well be that when a political movement would act in the same manner, this would not be treated in the same way. On the contrary, it appears to have become accepted that this would be part of legitimate discourse in society. The chair of the Mosque in Amsterdam summarized his reflection on the matter as follows: “If we gathered to burn Bibles in front of Churches, it would immediately be stopped. But when someone from the far-right burns a Quran, the right to freedom of speech is invoked. They will be invited as guests on a talk show.” This is indicative of a growing sense of weariness and injustice among members of religious communities regarding the alt-right’s overly liberal interpretation of the right to freedom of speech. Encouraging violent behaviour Another alarming problem: passively accepting hateful behaviour blurs and even silently shifts the line between controversial and downright hateful speech or action. Consequently the outliers in these categories then also tend to become more extreme. Xenophobic graffiti on a place of worship or burning a holy book at a protest, prviously would have been denounced as an act of hatred. Now there is increasingly public debate in some European countries on whether this may not be a legitimate exercise of freedom of speech. By normalizing this behaviour, someone looking to send a “strong message” may feel encouraged to take it further, including through acts of violence. This may sound abstract or theoretical, but the effect can be witnessed in real-world occurrences. In 2016, five men gathered to throw firebombs against a Mosque in Enschede; Netherlands, with the specific purpose of sending a convincing message to the municipality and Islamic community in the region that the 'Islamification of the country' had to be stopped.[vi] Representatives of the different religious communities all explicitly recognized that it is only one per cent of people that take things too far. Nevertheless, in the context of an already aggressive and xenophobic 'normal', these outliers can be expected to become more common and even more hateful and dangerous. Besides posing a serious direct threat to the safety of the members of different religious communities, this growing threat obstructs one of the core functions of any place of worship: being open and accessible to all. All representatives of religious groups interviewed in the PARTES proejct expressed in unison their conviction that being open to anyone with an interest in their religion is their highest priority. Balancing this openness with safety measures is inherently conflicting – certain places have already started closing doors by default and opening them only when the good intention of the visitor is confirmed. This is not to say that they are locking the doors in fear of populist mobs showing up. But inflammatory rhetoric, in large parts encouraged or enabled by populist movements, has created a widely shared feeling of intolerance. The notion of 'live and let live' appears to be getting replaced with an intentionally incorrect understanding of what the right of freedom of speech is supposed to mean. "Not everything that is legal is ethical" Although these research findings were made in The Netherlands through dialogue with stakeholders in various religious communities, they represent an issue also relevant in Scandinavia, Central and Eastern Europe as well as Southern Europe. On an European level, the problem has at least been recognized: representatives of several European Union institutions have made respective statements on this topic following the Quran burnings in Sweden. Josep Borrell, High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, stated: “We continue to stand up for freedom [...] of expression, abroad and at home; but not everything that is legal is ethical.”[vii] It will ultimately be up to the Member States of the European Union to clearly define a balanced middle ground in their domestic legal systems which protect freedom of speech - but in a way that is not detrimental to the free and safe accessibility of places of worship. Further recommended reading: On the purpose of freedom of speech: read this Amnesty International article On how populist movements make intentional misuse of freedom of speech: read this article published on the Dahrendorf Forum. Robert Örell, Director of the Swedish NGO Transform, is an independent expert with over 20 years of experience in Exit work. He led Exit Sweden for 10 years and served as the program director for ExitUSA for 3 years. Since 2011, Robert has been a member of the Steering Committee of the EU RAN, where he co-chairs the RAN Rehabilitation working group. [i] Nils Napierala and Andrea Römmele, “The Populist Demand for Freedom of Speech is a Distraction—Nothing More,” Dahrendorf Forum, February 28, 2019. https://www.dahrendorf-forum.eu/the-populist-demand-for-freedom-of-speech-is-a-distraction-nothing-more/. [ii] Poorvi Bellur, “Free Speech and Populism,” Colombia Political Review, January 6, 2017. http://www.cpreview.org/blog/2017/1/free-speech-and-populism. [iii] Ibid. [iv] Nils Napierala and Andrea Römmele, “The Populist Demand for Freedom of Speech is a Distraction—Nothing More,” Dahrendorf Forum, February 28, 2019. https://www.dahrendorf-forum.eu/the-populist-demand-for-freedom-of-speech-is-a-distraction-nothing-more/. [v] Daniel Takash, “Copyright Cuts Both Ways for Free Speech,” August 18, 2020. https://www.niskanencenter.org/copyright-cuts-both-ways-for-free-speech/. [vi] Rechtbank Overijssel, “Terroristen bestraft voor brandbom op moskee Enschede,” Rechtspraak, October 27, 2016. https://uitspraken.rechtspraak.nl/#!/details?id=ECLI:NL:RBOVE:2016:4134. [vii] EEAS Press Team, “Sweden/Denmark: Statement by the High Representative Josep Borrell on the burning of Quran and respect for community symbols,” The European External Action Services, July 26, 2023. https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/swedendenmark-statement-high-representative-josep-borrell-burning-quran-and-respect-community_en.

The landscape of European exit organizations comprises various groups primarily active in Western Europe. Since the establishment of the first European Exit organization in Norway in 1996, this field has continued to evolve. These organizations play a crucial role in assisting individuals who are leaving violent extremist groups, aiding in their disengagement and rehabilitation process. Most programs adopt an individualized approach, tailoring their services to meet the specific needs and risks of their clients. Additionally, exit programs often extend support to families who are concerned about the involvement of their loved ones in violent extremist groups. Exit organizations differ in their scale, operational methodologies, target ideological groups, and the specific context in which they operate. They can be found either in the prison-probation context or in open settings that accept clients both inside and outside the criminal justice system. These services are often provided by non-governmental organizations (NGOs). One advantage of NGOs is their autonomy from the state, which facilitates contact with clients and fosters trust-building, as violent extremists tend to be opposed to the "establishment". Principles of Exit Work As part of the EU-funded project EUTEx (”Developing a European framework for disengagement and reintegration of extremist offenders and radicalised individuals in prison, including returning foreign terrorist fighters and their families”), a training course for practitioners was developed and conducted. In order to optimize the effectiveness of the course, an assessment was carried out to identify and analyse the diverse approaches and practices employed in the field of disengagement and reintegration, including those utilized by NGOs. Based on 47 interviews with social workers and psychologists regarding their practical work, three essential and effective practices were identified in Europe: Cognitive Behavioural Therapy (CBT) (15%), Motivational Interviewing (MI) (5%), and the establishment of a Working Alliance (WA) (3%). This blog post explores these and other aspects from the perspective of NGO exit work. Most exit work operates through individualized intervention plans and multidisciplinary teams. The client's journey begins with gathering information about their case, conducting needs assessments to understand their background, current situation, and various needs and risks. This information is then utilized to develop an individual intervention plan, which is assigned to a case manager. The case manager acts as the primary point of contact, connecting the client with internal and external support services. Process Ownership: Violent extremist groups exert strong control over their members' perceptions and world views. The ideology and group dynamics guide and validate "the correct" interpretation and understanding of world events. When individuals become less involved with the group and eventually decide to leave, a crucial aspect is their ownership over the exit process. This means that clients must be involved and take responsibility for their own journey of change. Instead of being told what to do or think, exit professionals guide their clients on making pro-social, constructive, and non-violent decisions. Building trust with a hard-to-reach target group requires time, patience, and persistence. Assisting clients in their journey of change may span over several years. Establishing a trusting relationship with the client is vital, much like in other fields such as social work, psychotherapy, and probation. Trust forms the foundation for the case manager's ability to influence and facilitate change for the client. Trust can be cultivated through various methods, including being transparent about the exit organization's goals and work methods. Spending informal and unstructured time together initially, engaging in activities and problem-solving, can also aid in the trust-building process. Maintaining non-judgmental and non-confrontational attitudes when working with violent extremist clients is key to fostering successful cooperation. Five Areas of Needs in Exit Work Functional reintegration: This focuses on practical aspects such as providing housing, relocation assistance, employment and educational support, tattoo removal, financial aid, and assistance with administrative tasks. Social reintegration: This addresses the exploration of social identity, social and family relationships, and the strengthening of pro-social networks. It also involves identifying obstacles to social reintegration, such as isolation, stigmatization, and anger and conflict management. Cognitive needs: These pertain to the strengthening of critical thinking, reorienting world views, and questioning the ideology that promotes violence. Mental health-related needs: This encompasses addressing trauma, post-traumatic stress, substance abuse, and mental health issues. Security-related needs: These involve consulting with law enforcement and security services to assess safety risks, including the possibility of retaliation from violent extremist groups, and other security-related aspects. Challenges The current challenges in the field of Exit work include the need to enhance program evaluations and the lack of long-term funding for Exit organizations. Evaluating practices and measuring success is complicated due to the lack of consensus and standards regarding the precise goals of exit work, whether it be focused on disengagement (behavioural changes), deradicalization (altering violent-promoting ideologies), reintegration (returning to society and pro-social communities), or rehabilitation (transitioning away from a violent lifestyle). European Exit organizations heavily rely on state funding, with few alternative sources of stable financial support. State funding is typically provided on an annual basis, while the casework may span multiple years, especially for clients serving long prison sentences. Consequently, the absence of long-term funding streams in European member states poses challenges for Exit organizations. Outlook for the Exit Field The current landscape of violent extremism in Europe suggests an increase in polarization and the spread of conspiracy theories, which has been further exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic. As a result, there is a growing need for additional approaches to primary, secondary, and tertiary prevention. The field of Exit work in Europe is still relatively young. However, there are several other fields, such as conflict resolution, mediation, and restorative justice practices, that offer valuable experiences and promising practices which can be further incorporated into the Exit work field. The training developed in the afore-mentioned EUTEx project serves as a promising example of building capacity and skills among first-line practitioners in the field - follow this link to learn more about the project's outputs and achievements. Further recommended reading: RAN (Radicalization Awareness Network): The role of civil society organisations in exit work (2022) RAN Exit: Minimal methodological requirements for exit interventions (2016) - this publication includes both process-oriented principles and practical aspects of exit work. RAN activities on Rehabilitation (2022) RAN Centre of Excellence: Peer and Self Review Manual for Exit Work (van de Donk, M., Uhlmann, M., & Keijze, F. (2020)) Robert Örell, Director of the Swedish NGO Transform, is an independent expert with over 20 years of experience in Exit work. He led Exit Sweden for 10 years and served as the program director for ExitUSA for 3 years. Since 2011, Robert has been a member of the Steering Committee of the EU RAN, where he co-chairs the RAN Rehabilitation working group.

FROM TRAUMA TO TRANSFORMATION Mental health holds significant relevance within the realm of radicalization and violent extremism. When individuals entrenched in radical ideologies also face mental health challenges, tailored therapeutic interventions become integral to the disengagement process. Broadly, mental health issues encountered in cases of radicalization and violent extremism can be classified into three overarching categories: personality disorders, psychosis, and psychological issues. Personality disorder and psychosis Every individual possesses a unique blend of personality traits and moral characteristics that can evolve and adapt in various situations. In normal circumstances, people exhibit diverse behaviours depending on their environment, desires, and interests. For instance, they may display patience with family members but impatience with colleagues, or be helpful towards strangers but negligent towards friends in times of need. The crucial concepts here are balance and plasticity. However, individuals with personality disorders lack this equilibrium and flexibility. Those with sociopathic personality traits, for instance, perpetually exhibit impatience and self-centredness, irrespective of their surroundings. They disregard moral norms, exhibit limited empathy towards others, and consistently react in a selfish manner, even when someone attempts to offer assistance. Consider the following example: Mr. A is a 35-year-old suffering from a sociopathic personality disorder. His journey began as a juvenile delinquent, eventually transitioning into a criminal lifestyle in adulthood, resulting in multiple incarcerations. At the age of 30, he embraced Islam and proceeded to organize recruitment and logistical support networks for acts of terrorism, alongside engaging in criminal activities to finance his jihadist endeavours. Remarkably, devoid of pathological delusions, he manages to lead an ostensibly "normal" life, efficiently coordinating his illicit operations. Regrettably, due to his lack of emotional and intellectual adaptability, be it in matters of crime or religion, his actions consistently manifest in the same self-centred and violent manner. Individuals with personality disorders channel their innate violence through various ideologies, just as they would through crime or sexuality. This partly explains their ease of transition from crime to jihad: their personality and behaviour remain unchanged, but the means of expression have shifted. In the case of psychosis, the issue lies not in the balance or plasticity of one's traits and characteristics, but rather in the permanent disturbance of the psyche caused by pathological mechanisms. Delusions and hallucinations disrupt normal emotional and intellectual functioning, even in individuals who may appear pleasant and composed in their daily lives. For some, the pathology hinders the natural capacities of thought and emotion production. It is worth noting that the majority of individuals with psychosis pose no harm to others, but rather are vulnerable and often become victims of aggression. Mr. B, at the age of 19, left for Syria in 2016 after being captivated by news reports and videos from Daesh. He discovered that war, with its excitement and violence, was the only source of emotions for him—combining indignation, anger, and even pleasure. As violence became his sole means of experiencing any kind of emotion, he increasingly embraced it. His decision to go to Syria was driven by the desire to live in a perpetual state of stimulation. However, just a week after his arrival, surviving an improvised explosive device nearly cost him his life, prompting him to return home. Subsequently, following his arrest and imprisonment, a psychiatrist diagnosed him with schizophrenia, the most prevalent form of psychosis. With appropriate medication, he no longer entertains thoughts of jihad. Other psychological factors in radicalization There are other psychological issues involved in radicalization, such as addiction, pathological bereavement, social or family exclusion, among many others. In such cases, radicalization is associated with frustration, anger, and a sense of being misunderstood or left out. It is important to note that these issues are not exclusive to the process of radicalization; they are commonly experienced by individuals who seek mental health support. Additionally, a history of childhood or adolescent sexual assault is frequently found in the biographies of women involved in jihad. Ms. C, a 23-year-old woman, endured repeated abuse at the age of 16 from her brothers upon discovering that she was having a love affair. At 17, she was raped by an uncle. At 19, she married a fighter online and travelled to Syria to support the jihad war effort. After her husband's death three years later, she decided to return home with her two children, no longer wanting to raise them in a war-torn country. She also expressed disappointment with the unnecessary cruelty of Daesh towards prisoners. Initially, practising her religious beliefs in a strict manner helped her cope with the sexual traumas she had endured. However, upon witnessing the jihadist soldiers committing similar acts on the women they had taken as prisoners, she realized the complete distortion of their practice of Islam. Radicalized individuals who suffer from psychological issues, such as trauma, embrace propaganda not because it is true, but because it serves a purpose. It provides them with feelings of hope, consolation, redemption, and a sense of brother- or sisterhood. It enables them to join a group where others share similar psychological struggles, offering acceptance and understanding without stigmatization. Effective Approaches & Guidelines When dealing with radicalized individuals with mental health problems, a comprehensive clinical care strategy can be pursued through three interconnected approaches: addressing the ideology, modifying behaviour, and tackling grooming mechanisms. Depending on the specific case, certain dimensions may carry more significance than others. Understanding Ms. C's commitment requires acknowledging the importance of the notion of purity and the punishment of rapists within Daesh's ideology. For others, exposing the manipulative tactics employed by recruiters can play a vital role in the disengagement process. In practical implementation, regardless of the nature of the mental health issues, certain guidelines can be followed: Firstly, identify the specific issue (such as psychosis or depression) and offer an appropriate therapy that does not directly address the radical beliefs, but instead aims to establish a bond. Utilize that bond to separate violent behaviour from the beliefs. Channel and alleviate violent behaviour through sports, cultural activities, and artistic pursuits. Avoid direct opposition to the ideology, but instil doubt by highlighting that convictions are not entirely wrong, acknowledging positive intentions such as helping women and children, while also acknowledging the negative aspects, such as needless and indiscriminate violence. Focus on raising awareness of grooming mechanisms. When individuals become aware of being manipulated, they tend to lose trust in the groomer and begin questioning their commitment to the ideology. The objective of these therapy approaches is to help individuals understand that violence, like anger, is ultimately a behaviour that can be managed in a socially acceptable manner. Guillaume Monod is a psychiatrist, pedopsychiatrist and holds a PhD in philosophy. After working for twelve years with juvenile offenders, his research focuses on mental health, violent crime, radicalisation, and rehabilitation of former offenders.

THE POSITIVE EFFECTS OF VIDEO GAMES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR P/CVE Gaming is one of the most popular leisure time activities and billions of gamers play with and against each other, watch others play video games, or spend time on gaming-related digital platforms. While the vast majority of gamers are peaceful, the 2019 right-wing extremist attack in Christchurch (New Zealand) and the subsequent discovery that extremist actors are seeking to exploit digital gaming spaces for their ends, has caused concern that gaming could potentially contribute to radicalization processes. While research efforts on gaming and extremism are still in their infancy, the last years have shown that extremist actors use gaming in various ways, including the production of bespoke games, the modification of existing games, the use of in-game communication features, the presence on gaming (-adjacent) platforms, the use of video game references and aesthetics in propaganda output, and the gamification of digital spaces. Unsurprisingly, the discourse on the potential nexus between gaming and extremism does not only involve discussions on how extremist actors are seeking to exploit gaming in various ways, but also how this exploitation may be prevented and how gaming may be used for positive interventions such as increasing democratic attitudes and tolerant perceptions. GameD is a pilot project seeking to utilize gaming to make a positive impact in the context of preventing and countering (violent) extremism (P/CVE) and develop a game-based intervention to support the development of positive attitudes towards democracy. While several games with P/CVE-related content exist, these games are often focused on education rather than entertainment. They are often text-heavy, employ simple graphics, are based on a static game world and linear storyline, use relatively simple mechanics and controls, afford players only binary choices, and prioritize serious topics over fun and engaging gameplay. GameD seeks to go beyond existing P/CVE video games and design a game that is a true entertainment-education experience, i.e. a game with education content that is genuinely appealing and entertaining to create a genuine gaming experience. To do so, the project is anchored in a thorough understanding of the existing literature on video game design, player types and differences, the psychological appeal of video games and which factors may satisfy players’ emotional needs, and insights into the positive effects video games are able to elicit. A recent GameD report reviews existing literature on the positive effects of gaming in light of the specific needs of the P/CVE field and deduces recommendations for practitioners seeking to develop a bespoke game for the P/CVE context. This includes, most prominently: Learning & Education Video games have been successfully used in educational settings to improve a range of learning outcomes. Videogames are viable tools to facilitate learning, because they are more fun than other forms of instruction, provide immediate feedback to the learner, and match the level of difficulty to the players’ abilities, which allows a tailored learning experience and the opportunity for each learner to progress at their own pace. Video games with P/CVE content could build upon existing research on video games’ positive effects on learning and, for instance, seek to increase players’ knowledge about issues surrounding radicalization and extremism or improve their critical thinking skills to inoculate them against online disinformation or conspiracy theories – similar to Moonshot’s digital literacy game Gali Fakta. Social Outcomes While the public discourse often focused on the anti-social effects and violent outcomes of playing video games, research has also uncovered a range of positive social outcomes that video games are able to elicit. This includes, for example, the development of social communication skills, a greater willingness for teamwork and collaboration, the decrease of aggression and increase of empathy, and the development of social connections and friendships. Unsurprisingly, it is the content and the narrative underlying the video game that is the strongest facilitator of prosocial outcomes. Current P/CVE games do not usually focus on social outcomes and are often aimed at the individual level only. Future games could, however, seek to facilitate positive social outcomes, e.g. by strengthening feelings of belonging, nudging players to work together, or encouraging intercultural communication. Attitudes & Perceptions Research has also uncovered that video games can impact players’ perceptions and both implicit and explicit attitudes by encouraging perspective-taking and facilitating prosocial attitudes. Here too the games usually elicit such effects via the narrative that guides the gameplay. P/CVE actors could seek to facilitate the development of positive attitudes in players, e.g. by encouraging perspective-taking with out-groups, and the decrease of negative perceptions, e.g. by seeking to reduce stereotypes or Manichean worldviews. Behaviour Lastly, studies on the positive effects of video games have uncovered that video games may support positive behaviour change, e.g. by encouraging players to make health-related behavioural adjustments for a healthier lifestyle or by reducing anti-social behavioural tendencies. Importantly, video games may be able to both reduce negative behaviour and facilitate positive behavioural choices. P/CVE actors could seek to facilitate desired behavioural changes, especially regarding the reduction of anti-social behaviour and increase in prosocial behaviour to advance their prevention aims. Crucially, there are not the video game effects. Because video games are so diverse and span a number of different genres, their effects are far from uniform. Hence, when designing a serious game, it is important to ask which game is most suitable to elicit which effects. Similarly, there are also not the video game players. Players have vastly different preferences, personality traits, different motivations to play a certain video game, and seek to fulfil different psychological needs through the gaming experience. Consequently, while research has uncovered a multitude of positive effects video games are able to have on players, individual reception is contingent upon the type of game and the player type of any given user and cannot be fully predicted. Overall, the existing research clearly demonstrates that video games can elicit a range of positive effect. P/CVE actors could seek to leverage these positive effects in the video games they design. To do so, it is recommended that: Even serious games must be enjoyable and entertaining in their own right to elicit persuasive effects. This means that good game design is key and cooperation between P/CVE actors and game designers and other gaming experts is crucial. Current P/CVE games are often simple, text-heavy, and offer only binary choices, suggesting that there is room for improvement in the games’ entertainment appeal. Ideally, P/CVE games should cater to different player types and should allow players to fulfil important psychological needs such as competence, autonomy, and relatedness as well as offer motivational drivers for engagement. Existing research points to a variety of positive effects video games can elicit and, consequently, the goals serious games may seek to achieve can range from educational outcomes to shaping or changing attitudes, facilitating positive social outcomes, and even influencing behaviour. This suggests that P/CVE games could seek to elicit similar effects. However, more research is needed on how games can support P/CVE-specific aims and outcomes. Linda Schlegel ist Research Fellow bei modusIzad und Doktorandin an der Goethe-Universität Frankfurt. Ihre Forschungsschwerpunkte sind narrative Kampagnen gegen Extremismus, digitale Radikalisierungsprozesse sowie Gaming/Gamification und (Counter-)Extremismus. © Image: https://indivisiblegame.com/

THE ROLE OF VOCATIONAL TRAINING FOR VEOs Dealing with violent extremist offenders (VEOs) – a group which includes terrorists and others considered at risk of engaging in violent extremism, in our context in a prison and probation setting – is a relatively new challenge for the countries of the Western Balkans. The acts of violent extremism in Albania include several criminal offenses that are defined by the Penal Code of the Republic of Albania, such as (i) Article 230 Acts of terrorist intention; (ii) Article 231 Recruitment of persons for committing acts with terrorist intentions or financing of terrorism; (iii) Article 232 Training to commit acts of terrorist intentions; (iv) Article 234 Manufacturing military weapons (terrorist organization); and (v) Article 265 Incitement of hatred or disputes (265/a - Involvement in military operations in a foreign state, Article 265/b - Organising the involvement in military operations in a foreign state and Article 265/c - Call for involvement in violent military operations in a foreign state). The annual reports from the Albanian General Prosecution Office reveal that during the period 2015 – 2021, a total of 13 VEOs have been imprisoned in penitentiary institutions in Albania. Nine of those consisted of a ‘cell’ of two unauthorized imams and seven affiliates which was dismantled in 2015. They were sentenced to 7 to 18 years in prison for inciting hatred or disputes and for their role in coordinating and recruiting over 70 Albanian citizens (foreign terrorist fighters and their families) to join the war in Syria. According to the Albanian State Intelligence Service (SIS), VEOs continue to maintain a radical profile in the penitentiary system and are actively engaged in radicalization activities. SIS also fears that VEOs’ degree of radicalization may affect the security situation in the country after the completion of their sentences. As regards the Albanian citizens who joined the conflict in Syria, the country has been unable to repatriate men, but only 37 women and children, who were all placed in rehabilitation programs outside the penitentiary settings. Why should we work on the reintegration of VEOs? Apart from keeping the community safe from offenders, the penitentiary system has an important role to play in supporting the eventual integration of offenders back into society and thus facilitating their resistance process. It is almost impossible to keep people in custody after the end of their sentence in a legal system. After having “paid their debt to society” detainees are supposed to be able to live among their fellow citizens again. At the same time, releasing individuals deemed dangerous is not a good option considering the potential danger they might pose to society. Working on prisoners’ reintegration is hence a sustainable solution to that end, and should therefore be a key element in any strategy related to preventing and countering violent extremism. Besides the lack of alternative solutions, working on VEO reintegration brings several benefits. As mentioned in the Council of Europe's Handbook for Prison and Probation Services regarding Radicalization and Violent Extremism, the strategy of relevant services should be the prevention of violent extremist offenders’ reoffending, the prevention of radicalization in both prison and probation settings and the establishment of a long-term preventative strategy within the criminal justice system. Against this backdrop, working on VEO reintegration can potentially impede further radicalization among their ranks and the radicalization of other offenders in the penitentiary setting.The latter is highlighted as an issue in Albanian prisons, however does not amount to the dimensions of the problems encountered in other European countries which are confronted with an unprecedented number of extremist and terrorist offenders. In an attempt to inhibit radicalization activities within the penitentiary system, the Albanian Ministry of Justice isolated one VEO by placing him under the “41 Bis”, which is a specific prison regime in High-Security Prisons that isolates certain individuals in prison, thus restricting their contact with others. The placement of the VEO under this regime backfired without achieving positive results. This ‘isolationist’ prison regime is not being used for VEOs anymore, as the costs of this regime outweigh the benefits, given that it leads to perceptions of unfairness not only with the VEOs themselves but also to the public outside the penitentiary setting, thus contributing to the VEOs “system of meaning” (a network of mental models that provides the lens through which supporters of violent extremists are compelled to perceive and judge the world) in Albania. The main long-term benefit of working with VEOs is their potential to lower recidivism – which constitutes the continuation of, or return to, a previous pattern of criminal behavior – and help offenders’ safe transition to the community. Specifically, recidivism refers to new criminal activity by an individual after completing a prison sentence. Compared to the rate for the general criminal population, which in many countries surpasses 50 percent, the recidivism rate for terrorist offenders is substantially lower, ranging between 2 – 7 percent. This applies both to general re-offending, as well as to terrorism-related offending. Although those low figures may be a source of relief, they do not reveal the whole picture. This data in European countries does not provide comprehensive recidivism figures for all individuals who have been marked as extremists during their stay in prison, but only for those who are serving their sentence for terrorism-related offenses. Besides, it is not safe to assume that VEOs would not re-offend, and even if a single re-offence occurs, it can have a dangerous impact, especially if it materializes in a terrorist attack, such as with the London Bridge attack in 2019, or the Vienna attack in 2020. Thus, working on VEOs’ reintegration will potentially impede further radicalization in prisons, lower recidivism, and will ultimately make an important contribution to strengthening community resilience by transforming actors that cause vulnerability. How should we work on the reintegration of VEOs? As one of the main phases of their rehabilitation plan, the reintegration of VEOs back into society is a long and difficult process that requires multi-agency and multi-disciplinary approaches with a particular focus on the transition between prison and probation. The literature in this field indicates that developing VEOs’ skills through vocational training is important not only to minimize distress but also to potentially facilitate the transition period once the inmate is released. In the Albanian context, vocational trainings are the most welcomed programs by VEOs. Vocational training, such as entrepreneurship programs within prisons, offer a realistic opportunity for reducing recidivism. Vocational training provides learners with essential skills enhancing their employability, supporting their personal development and encouraging active citizenship. These are important elements in the context of radicalization, considering that economic deprivation makes it difficult for individuals to stay connected with their society or to provide for their livelihood, which then contributes to grievances and a loss of hope. In areas with high unemployment and a lack of prospect, there is certainly a greater vulnerability to radicalization. As an Albanian imam described it, “the economic aspect is very important, in the sense that if someone has a job, that person has a normal system of living that does not allow room for radicalization.” Considering that vocational training is an effective tool for employability, personal development, and active citizenship, it is important to capitalize on its potential for VEOs’ reintegration. Nevertheless, vocational training cannot be a stand-alone pillar, and it risks becoming useless if not adopted into the broader rehabilitation process of VEOs. Instead, a vocational training program can serve as an entry point where prison staff and exit workers establish personal relations with offenders and facilitate their engagement in the broader rehabilitation and reintegration process while conducting regular risk, needs, and reintegration assessments. For this to be feasible, prison staff and exit workers need to develop a wide range of competencies that involve prosocial modelling, cognitive restructuring, motivational interviewing and sentence planning – or more specific ones such as faith-based interventions. Building resilient communities depends partly on the successful reintegration of VEOs. Although reintegration is a long and difficult process in which VEOs are usually reluctant to participate in, vocational training provides a promising entry point for practitioners to earn VEOs’ trust and encourage their rehabilitation and reintegration. This can only be achieved through the development of practitioners’ competencies; a multi-agency and multi-disciplinary framework with evidence-based, effective practices; a solid risk assessment; information-sharing; linking-up prison and probation at different stages of the same process; and continuous monitoring of the whole process. To this end, Albania is part of the EU-financed project EUTEx which seeks to address the aforementioned aspects by developing a European framework for the disengagement and reintegration of extremist offenders and radicalized individuals in prison. The project establishes this framework by building on European knowledge, skills and products, taking them further by summoning the best expertise in relevant fields, and implementing it Europe-wide. Projects like this are important to fill the gaps in the current rehabilitation and reintegration efforts, as they provide an opportunity to develop the capacities of prison and probation staff, enhance internal mechanisms and practices, and exchange practices at regional or international level. Romario Shehu is a Project Coordinator and researcher at the Institute for Democracy and Mediation in Albania and member of the team implementing the EUTEx project. His work centers on violent extremism, organized crime, and foreign policy. He holds an MSc in International Relations and a BA in Political Science and International Relation.

AN OVERVIEW OF CURRENT LIMITATIONS AND KEY FUTURE STEPS Following recent developments in Europe, namely the return of thousands of European Foreign Terrorist Fighters, and the subsequent rise of repressive governmental responses, the number of individuals arrested, investigated, prosecuted, charged, and imprisoned for violent extremism and terrorism-related offences has steadily increased (Heide, van der Zwan & van Leyenhorst, 2018). As a result, the interest in and demand for screening and assessing the risk of radicalisation and (re-)offending has also incremented both in the academia and policy realms (ibid). As follows, risk assessment instruments have widely become support tools within the criminal justice system that frame data collection to inform decision-making, help point out potential risks, and manage offenders (Cornwall & Molenkamp, 2018). Despite the widespread consensus that risk assessment tools by and large cannot predict future behaviours, research has shown that these can come in handy when identifying specific characteristics be it individual or contextual (e.g., history of past behaviour, isolation, radical milieu), which, in a given context, are able to signal the likelihood of an individual engaging in antisocial conducts (RTI International, 2018) that go beyond an attempt to profile vulnerable individuals. As a point in fact, accompanying the greater trend of reaching scientificity and efficiency in this field, risk assessment has also undergone a development process to become as scientifically grounded as possible. The structured professional judgement approach (SPJ) approach has been trending in the field of violence risk assessment for the past decades, being recognised as a good practice to follow, in order to effectively assess and manage the violence risk posed by vulnerable individuals (Bloom, Webster, Hucker & De Freitas, 2005). By providing structured guidelines, evaluators are guided in exercising discretion during violence risk assessment, being given a structured, yet flexible, process to follow. In this sense, they are able to look at risk as more than a linear function of the total number and score of risk factors. Moreover, the SPJ framework is inherently preventive, as it guides assessment and intervention, thus helping to determine the risks of resorting to violence in assisting intervention efforts (Pressman, 2009). With this comprehensive background, risk assessment tools can be used to inform initial sentencing, custodial management, parole decisions, post-release monitoring, and rehabilitation (Douglas, Pugh, Singh, Savulescu & Fazel, 2017), therefore providing clues on how risk can be managed and mitigated (UNODC, 2016). When focusing on the P/CVE field, the Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) sustains that risk assessment tools can and should be used to determine organisational arrangements, guiding rehabilitative exit efforts, as well as the direction for treatment when necessary (Cornwall & Molenkamp, 2018). However, the complexity and singularity of radicalisation processes have led to some concerns. Firstly, it is understood that generic tools to assess the risk of violence might not be suitable to assess the risk of radicalisation and violent extremism, thus showcasing how extremist individuals display different motivations, actions, and rehabilitation needs (Knudsen, 2018; RTI International, 2018). Secondly, practical concerns have been voiced by civil society institutions regarding the use of radicalisation risk assessment tools in the pre-criminal sphere and as sentencing guides. In both cases, it has been noted that these instruments have the potential to fuel discriminatory tendencies if used in a harmful way to aggravate structural inequalities and grievances (Bucci, 2022). Bearing this in mind and considering the non-abundance of theoretical and empirical development of radicalisation risk assessment and its instruments, an analysis of their uses and limitations is required to establish a route for a non-biased, non-harmful, and effective application, thus complying with human and civil rights and fulfilling crime prevention and risk mitigation. Limitations and concerns of radicaliation risk assessment tools As has been observed, certain scientific and rights limitations and concerns arising from the use of radicalisation risk assessment tools can be pinpointed. For example, risk assessment tools tend to use a cumulative risk model, which does not match the complexity associated with radicalisation and violent extremism (Borum, 2015; RTI International, 2018). Additionally, considering the scarcity of radicalisation cases to build upon as well as their complexity, there is no single profile or path to ground radicalisation risk assessment tools on. As a matter of fact, research has demonstrated how the limited number of violent extremism cases will not suffice to create a specific or sensitive extremist profile. Therefore, there will be a large majority of individuals who might fit the generic profile, yet never engage in violence and vice-versa (Borum, 2015; RTI International 2018), hence increasing the likelihood of false positive and false negative results. Moreover, considering the reduced number of cases and practical difficulties to access these, radicalisation risk assessment tools lack empirical validation (RTI International 2018). Additionally, they sometimes convey inconsistent results given that, in practice, the effective implementation of risk assessment tools depends on the professionals applying them, namely on the degree of understanding, cooperation and coordination across the various stakeholders working with the tools, as well as on the tool itself (Cornwall & Molenkamp, 2018; RTI International, 2018). In addition to such limitations, several legal and cultural concerns must be mentioned since a balance between the importance of public safety and the rights of the assessed individual must be achieved (RTI International, 2018). For such a purpose an in-depth understanding of the radicalisation process is required, in order to prevent individuals from engaging in violence, whilst safeguarding and assuring their freedoms and rights (Silber & Bhatt, 2007, p. 12). Therefore, the scope of risk assessment must be evident to assessors, especially since holding radical and extremist viewpoints is not illegal in itself. Lastly, and relatedly, the use of risk assessment tools in communitarian settings is controversial considering the implicit risk of further alienating vulnerable and already marginalised communities and individuals, especially in the pre-criminal sphere. As follows, its implementation must be carefully considered and adequately carried out, preferably by highly trained professionals (Cornwall & Molenkamp, 2018). How to counter limitations: recommendations and best practices Considering the identified limitations and concerns and in view of the serious and manifold threat posed by the radicalisation process, some recommendations can be put forward to efficiently and effectively carry out its risk assessment. When assessing risks in the P/CVE field, professionals must comply with a human and civil rights framework by balancing these with the needs for public safety (Cornwall & Molenkamp, 2018; Ward & Birdgen, 2007). Such a practice adds a layer of needed qualification to guarantee effectiveness and procedural fairness during risk assessment procedures and their outcomes (Borum, 2015). That is especially true when working within the criminal justice system, since each assessment directly impacts the assessed individual, either in prison or in communitarian daily life. Therefore, and considering the seriousness of violent extremism and terrorism-related crimes, the consequential societal and political demands for justice effectiveness, and the current scientific advances, professionals conducting radicalisation risk assessment procedures must be continuously trained and qualified. Accordingly, to carry out radicalisation risk assessments, professionals should, in general: Be experienced in risk assessment – empirical research has demonstrated how years of experience can impact the effectiveness of the assessment. More experienced professionals reach more similar conclusions, conducting their assessments better, since these are better at identifying critical factors, and requesting additional information and clarifications, thus understanding the assessment results comprehensively (Cornwall & Molenkamp, 2018); Have informed knowledge and expertise in the P/CVE field; Have experience with the target population; Be trained on the specific risk assessment tool (Cornwall & Molenkamp, 2018; RTI International, 2018). Mobilise soft skills and adopt a non-judgemental and transparent stance, to build trust and confidence (Cornwall & Molenkamp, 2018). The clear importance of training As it becomes clear, properly conducting radicalisation risk assessment is a complex endeavour which requires well-trained, updated and suitable professionals to do so. For that reason, professional training is required. In this sense, and as pointed out by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and the European Commission, training must go beyond an initial or induction training. Indeed, first-line practitioners require P/CVE training in order to be able to understand, identify, prevent, and intervene on the radicalisation and violent extremism phenomena, but these should also be trained on the use of off-the-shelf tools. For such a process, an ongoing, continuous training is required as these professionals must be updated on risk assessment tools’ administration, being given skills to do so and to decide how, when and with whom to use them (RTI International, 2018). Thus, professionals must have a thorough understanding of the radicalisation process, its complexities and singularities, that would allow them to better select the risk assessment tool that ought to be used. Moreover, with adequate, comprehensive, and continuous training, the need to comply with a human rights framework – especially when guiding sentencing and rehabilitative exit efforts, as well as the need for holistic and comprehensive training – is reinforced (ibid). Additionally, bearing in mind that conducting radicalisation risk assessment is not an easy task as it can strain professionals with pressure and insecurity, support structures must be put in place, alongside adequate and ongoing training, thus striving for professionals to be more confident in their decisions and used processes. Again, here training is paramount as it helps to prepare professionals for the challenges inherent in P/CVE (UNODC, 2016). Lastly, considering the increasing need to guarantee a prison-exit continuum, multi-agency cooperation should also be encompassed in training. The effective implementation of risk assessment tools hinges on the degree of understanding, cooperation and coordination across the various stakeholders working with the assessed individuals, which includes those professionals who directly provide input for the assessments, as well as those who carry out the assessment, and those who use its outcomes to develop a tailor-made intervention (Cornwall & Molenkamp, 2018). Such a comprehensive and common approach is the key to better exit outcomes as it improves the rehabilitation and disengagement processes. However, such a practice requires a common framework for different first-line practitioners to work with, hence assuring optimal information transfer and the best possible rehabilitative efforts, respecting the individual’s agency and needs. This holistic, tailored, and efficient approach to radicalisation risk assessment is what the EU-funded EUTEx project endeavours to establish. Through a European-wide partnership, EUTEx acknowledges that radicalised and extremist individuals’ successful disengagement and reintegration require a multi-agency and multi-disciplinary framework, hence the aim of providing a solid risk assessment plan. Additionally, by comprehensively involving stakeholders from prison, probation, and community settings, EUTEx seeks to develop a risk assessment framework that will ensure the prison – exit continuum, thus providing a comprehensive and adjustable approach to radicalisation risk assessment. In this sense, by doing so, the EUTEx project is expected to increase the quality, effectiveness, and professionalism of the management of terrorist and extremist individuals, which will lead to a long-term increase in European security. Margarida Damas is a Junior Consultant and Researcher at IPS_Innovative Prison Systems under the Radicalisation, Violent Extremism and Organised Crime portfolio. She focuses on the communitarian prevention of radicalisation and social inclusion and integration of socially vulnerable groups.

While the importance of the internet in today’s society as a driver of communication, gateway to vast amounts of information and enabler of socio-political participation to any type of social group is irrefutable, the drastic advancements in digital and communication technologies have posed numerous problems to state agencies, technology companies and researchers in its catalysation and diffusion of disinformation, extremist content and hate speech. Those issues have become even more intricate given the development of social media platforms and search engines’ algorithms, which curate and proliferate content based on the preference of users, magnifying already existing beliefs and thus causing group polarization. The current blog post will explore those matters further, first by providing a comprehensive definition of the term ‘fake news’. It will then examine the role of disinformation campaigns in the fuelling of hate speech and sectarianist sentiments online and evaluate to what extent that increases the radicalized views of certain individuals and could subsequently lead to extremist violence. The ‘Fake News’ Phenomenon In 2016, ‘post-truth’ was chosen as Word of the Year by the Oxford Dictionaries, yet as argued by Al-Rodhan (2017), the term is symptomatic of an era rather than just a year: “an era of boundless virtual communication, where politics thrives on a repudiation of facts and commonsense” (n.p.). As explained by the Oxford Dictionaries, post-truth is an adjective often associated with politics which is defined as “relating to or denoting circumstances in which objective facts are less influential in shaping public opinion than appeals to emotion and personal belief” (2016, n.p.). Thus, post-truth politics translates into assertions, which allure to one’s emotions and gut feeling, rather than having any basis on empirical evidence and valid information (Al-Rodhan, 2017). A post-truth era creates an ethical twilight zone, where the attached stigma to lying is lost, and lies could be told in impunity and with no consequences for one’s reputation (Keyes, 2004). That results in the creation of rumours, ‘fake news’ and conspiracy theories, which could go viral in short time and give impetus to false realities and serve propaganda purposes (Al-Rodhan, 2017). In the case of fake news, the term has acquired a dual meaning: on one hand, as fabricated or ‘false news’, which circulate online, and on the other – as a polemic weapon used to discredit news media channels (Quandt, Frischlich, Boberg and Schatto-Eckrodt, 2019, pp. 1-6). We would focus first on the former interpretation. According to Wardle (2017), the definition of fake news needs to be broken down as per the different types of content that are being created and shared, the motivations of those who create this content, and the ways this content is being disseminated. In line with that, she distinguishes seven types of fake news, namely: satire or parody, misleading content, imposter content, fabricated content, false connection, false context and manipulated content. Similarly, Nielsen and Graves (2017) describe fake news as a landscape that consists of poor journalism, political propaganda, and misleading forms of advertising and sponsored content. Other authors, such as Lazer et al. (2018, p.1094), define fake news as “fabricated information that mimics news media content in form but not in organizational process or intent”. Quandt et al. (2019, p.2) further summarise all the proposed definitions in a more systematized method by arguing that first a basic differentiation between (i) the core content of the information (including textual information, imagery, audio elements, etc.); (ii) accompanying meta-information (headlines/titles, author information, tags, and keywords); and (iii) contextual aspects (positioning, references to other articles, framing) needs to take place. Subsequently, all of these elements could be exposed to different degrees of falsehood, or incongruities from factuality, such as: (a) misleading (but factually correct) information; (b) additions or deletions of information (e.g., “enrichment” of facts by misleading or wrong information, or a change of meaning by omitting or deleting relevant information); and (c) complete fabrications without any factual basis. In addition to that, combinations of those elements could also occur (ibid). The second meaning of the term ‘fake news’, primarily used by former US President Donald Trump, stands for slandering news coverage that is unsympathetic and critical of one’s argumentation or administration (Holan, 2017). Trump used to label media channels as fake news whenever they gave him unfavourable coverage, yet his delegitimization was never followed by any rebuttal consisting of factual evidence or data (ibid). Thus, labelling someone as fake news functions as discrediting one’s story, diminishing trust in the media as a whole and obscuring the interpretation of the concept (Quandt et al., 2019). Historically, it has been considered a characteristic of authoritarian regimes to use such “Orwellian” technique in the appropriation of ordinary words and declaring their opposite in a bid to deprive their subjects from independent thinking and convince them in lies (Holan, 2017). A more appropriate term for such strategy nowadays is ‘gaslighting’, which stands for a psychological form of manipulation where “a person orchestrates deceptions and inaccurately narrates events to the extent that their victim stops trusting their own judgments and perceptions” (Jack, 2017, p.9). Hate Speech While until 2016 the concept of ‘hate speech’ existed within its own orbit, that year, the term started often arising simultaneously with ‘fake news’ (Gollatz and Jenner, 2018). The other factor that connected them was not only the similar incidents around which they appeared but also the same online milieu, particularly social media platforms such as Facebook (ibid). In that sense, oftentimes fake news stories include biased and discriminatory content towards members of certain groups of belonging. As argued by Blanco-Herrero and Calderon (2019), the growing cases of hate speech against refugees and migrants considerably owe to the circulation of fake news related to them in the social media space. The rise of nationalist right-wing parties and their derogatory rhetoric of portraying refugees and migrants as a threat have increased the cases of hate speech online and also have led to violence in real life, promoting hate crime (ibid). Particularly, in the case of refugees and migrants, the intolerance expressed does not relate only to xenophobia and racism, but to a large extent to the argument that the majority of them profess Islam, triggering Islamophobic sentiments. When it comes to mainstream and social media, Islam and Muslims tend to be linked to negative images, often related to violence and extremism, implying a danger to national security and amplifying the ‘us’ versus ‘them’ dichotomy (Aguilera-Carnerero and Azeez, 2016). Occasionally, that further trespasses the boundaries of the mass communications domain, by translating into institutional Islamophobia, where anti-Muslim prejudices have been promulgated within Western societies under the disguise of laws and regulations foisted as being for the benefit of the general public, such as the ban on burqas and mosques in some countries (Aguilera-Carnerero and Azeez, 2016; Esposito, 2019). Far-right political parties have further aided and abetted the passing of restrictive migrant policies and have triggered Islamophobic attitudes amongst the population through inaccurate and biased narratives about Muslims and Islam (Esposito, 2019). While the role of Islamophobia is well-researched in regard to Islamist radicalization by being at the core of brewing outrage among some Muslims, which in turn allows terrorist groups to hijack those personal feelings of discrimination, marginalization and victimization and convert them into extremist narratives (Abbas, 2012), this article focuses on the relatively new and less explored phenomenon of far-right domestic terrorism and radicalization of white men as a response to fake news and conspiracy theories online, especially vis-à-vis anti-Muslim and anti-immigrant discourses. The Online Disinformation-Terrorism Nexus As argued by Piazza (2021) there is scarce empirical research of the influence of disinformation on actual political violence, and hardly any on its connection to terrorism specifically. Thus, his latest study, which uses a sample of 150 countries for the period of 2000 and 2017, makes two key findings: On the one hand, countries which tend to circulate propaganda and disinformation online through the social media channels of their governments, political parties or foreign governments are subject to higher levels of domestic terrorism. On the other, the deliberate dissemination of disinformation online by political actors increases the political polarization of the country. In order to further illustrate those linkages, an analysis of the existing literature exhibits how while social media platforms were previously considered democracy’s allies, have increasingly become its foe, given that it is easier to discredit opponents. Instead of limiting their speech or criticizing them, one responds with a jumble of misleading and false information, leaving the readers in disarray of what is going on (Beauchamp, 2019). Oftentimes, members of the general public, including researchers and journalists, could lack the resources and tools to fact-check every piece of information and thus verify statements (Deibert, 2019): “By the time they do, the falsehoods may have already embedded themselves in the collective consciousness” (p.32). Even worse, attempts to directly repudiate them could result in their multiplicity by providing them with attention (ibid). Given the downpour of information and cacophony of viewpoints and comments, being confronted with such overflow of online materials, consumers tend to make use of cognitive shortcuts, which navigate them towards opinions that already fit their beliefs (ibid). In addition to that, by being exposed to such a myriad of information, users are more likely to start questioning the integrity of all media outlets, which often translates into cynicism and indifference (ibid). As a result, this increases the political apathy and undermines the faith in established democratic institutions, thus strengthening the support and tolerance for far-right, anti-establishment or radical actors, providing oxygen to authoritarian factions (Beauchamp, 2019). Social media platforms disproportionately assist far-right political parties by helping them bolster social divisions (ibid). They tend to demonize and further marginalize out-group communities such as refugees, immigrants and foreigners (ibid). The major strategy is to portray those individuals as intimidating and dangerous in order for the general population to accumulate fear and hatred against them (ibid). Bilewicz and Soral (2020) further explain how exposure to derogatory rhetoric against immigrants and minorities could lead the way to political radicalization and engagement in intergroup violence. They argue that frequent subjection to hate speech results in empathy being replaced with contempt vis-à-vis minority groups, which translates in the erosion of existing anti-discriminatory norms (ibid). Prominent examples include the ‘genocidal’ propaganda against Rohingya Muslim minorities in Myanmar, disseminated by not only the general population but also by Army representatives and the spokesman for Burma's de facto leader, Aung Sang Suu Kyi (Gowen and Bearak, 2017); the disinformation and fake news campaigns against Muslims in India on behalf of Hindutva right-wing groups, including false claims of cow slaughtering, child ritual sacrifices in mosques and attacks on Hindus (Vij, 2020); and, Hungary’s right-wing PM Viktor Orban’s government’s conspiracy theories regarding asylum seekers integration in Europe (BBC, 2019). Thus, as summarized by Piazza (2021), often these political agents use online communities to recruit followers, mold their standpoints and mobilise them to action. Disinformation helps to ferment and reinforce group grievances and opinions, deepening their sense of resentment and rage (ibid). Derogatory statements online have been largely discussed in the context of anti-immigration and xenophobic terrorist attacks such as the 2019 El Paso shooting, the 2019 Christchurch Mosque shooting in New Zealand and the 2018 Pittsburgh synagogue shooting (Bilewicz and Soral, 2020, p.1). As explained by Bilewicz and Soral (2020), the perpetrators of these attacks have been previously heavily exposed to anti-immigrant hate speech online and have used such derogatory language as a justification for their actions. Thus, the role of social media in the dissemination of such fake news and disinformation should not be dismissed. The perpetrators of the Christchurch Mosque and El Paso shootings, both prior to the attacks, sent their manifestos or ‘open letters’ to several media outlets or social media platforms and shared links to them on 8chan (Wong, 2019). The latter is particularly important for this blog post. 8chan [currently 8kun] is an imageboard website composed of user-created message boards, where individuals post anything of interest to them, almost entirely anonymous (ibid). Sometimes deemed a successor or offshoot of the much more popular imageboard 4chan, the 8chan website has been linked to extremist, bigotic, white supremacist, alt-right, neo-Nazi and anti-Semitic content, oftentimes being at the centre of inciting hate crimes and mass shootings (ibid). Although 8chan was removed from the Google search engine in an unprecedented move after being implicated in containing child pornography (Machkovech, 2015), the website still remains available on the web, especially after rebranding itself to 8kun. Particularly in recent years it became a prominent hub for the establishment and diffusion of the QAnon conspiracy theory. When it comes to the links between radicalization, domestic terrorism and disinformation, QAnon is at the forefront of examples used by scholars and researchers in the field (Garry, Walther, Mohamed and Mohammed, 2021). QAnon is a collection of miscellaneous conspiracy theories, with the central one arguing that a cabal of political elites and prominent public figures are part of a Satan-worshipping paedophile ring, and Donald Trump is the only person who could defeat them, often portrayed as the nation’s saviour (ibid). The name originates from ‘Q’, as in “Q Clearance,” which is a top-secret category of federal security clearances in the US, and ‘Anon’ as in “anonymous”, arguing that this is an individual who drops to his followers clues to what is going to happen next, based on his access to highly confidential information at the government (ibid). While QAnon incorporates various conspiracy narratives, its followers have managed to deduce concrete goals, translatable into actions, namely: “A. “A massive information dissemination program meant to: Expose massive global corruption and conspiracy to the people. Cause the people to research further to aid further in their “great awakening.” B. Root out corruption, fraud, and human rights violations worldwide. C. Return the Republic of the United States to the Constitutional rule of law and also return “the People” worldwide to their own rule.”(ibid, p. 160). While conspiracy thinking and violent extremist ideologies share different categories, they could nonetheless intersect (ibid). Such overlap increases security concerns and establishes a dangerous mechanism when the conspiracy asserts that: “(1) one group is superior to another (superiority versus inferiority); (2) one group is under attack by the other (imminent threat); and (3) the threat is apocalyptic in nature (existential threat)” (RAN, 2020, p.3). Thus, in the case of QAnon, all the abovementioned factors are present (Garry et al., 2021). Further research shows how, when those features are combined with characteristics such as low self-control, law-relevant morality and self-efficacy, this could directly lead to violent extremist action (RAN, 2020). That was particularly the case of Edgar Welch, who in 2016 stormed a Washington-based pizza restaurant with an AR-15 rifle and started indiscriminately shooting, believing that the venue was the stage of a Hillary Clinton-run child sex network (LaFrance, 2020). While this particular case was known as the Pizzagate conspiracy theory, it largely gave the impetus of QAnon (ibid). The storming of the US Capitol was also initiated by QAnon supporters (Argentino, 2021). Johnson (2018, pp. 100-115) calls this process of self-radicalization of white men through fake news the result of masculinist paranoia that is built into the social processes of human and nonhuman communication, acts as a defence to a perceived threat and is what gives oxygen to conspiracy theories to further proliferate, creating a vicious cycle. Conclusion This blog post aimed to concisely portray the phenomenon of fake news, its role in fuelling hate speech and extremist messages online, and thus its prospects for leading individuals on the path of radicalization. Particularly with the rapid development of technologies such as artificial intelligence and the genesis of ‘deep fakes’, the challenges of combatting disinformation have reached a new high. Yoana Barakova is a Senior Research Analyst at the Amsterdam-based European Foundation for South Asian Studies (EFSAS). She holds a degree in Criminology from the University of Leicester, UK. Her research focuses on issues related to the region of South Asia, particularly prevention of radicalization, counter-terrorism, human rights protection, Indo-Pak relations and the Jammu & Kashmir conflict. She often speaks at supranational platforms such as the United Nations and various universities across Europe.

The increasing number and diversity of offenders convicted in Europe for crimes associated with violent extremism crimes as well as the growing concern about their risk of recidivism upon release presents a host of distinctive challenges for prison systems. These include gathering intelligence, strengthening inter-agency cooperation, assessing risks, and developing rehabilitation and reintegration plans. To meet them, countries have generally responded by strengthening the capacities of their prison and probation staff. Through training programmes on preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE), professionals at penitentiary institutions are expected to acquire the knowledge, skills, and attitudes they need to engage efficiently with extremists and inmates at risk of radicalisation, and to work cooperatively and transparently with a range of relevant actors inside and outside penitentiary institutions. However, despite intensive efforts to create a qualified, experienced and coordinated prison and probation workforce, European countries have made uneven progress towards this goal. How are prison staff in Europe being equipped to cope with violent extremism? And what factors help to understand the current gaps? The EU-financed EUTEx project, in which the author is currently engaged in, aims to contribute to a better training of workers who interact directly with terrorist and violent extremist offenders (VEOs). Drawing on information gathered by the author in interviews and exchanges with policymakers, front-line practitioners and researchers, this article takes stock of the situation in the 10 European countries where extremism is currently most prevalent (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and France). Country information is provided in an aggregate manner. What are the main deficits in training for prison and probation staff? A key pillar in national strategies against violent extremism across Europe, training programmes on P/CVE for prison and probation staff have flourished and multiplied in recent years. Their objectives, contents, depth and recipients differ from country to country, which has led to significant national differences: Training goals: The most basic learning objective that training programmes seek to fulfill is to build a knowledge base about violent extremism among prison staff. In general, staff receive background information on the current and historical context of violent extremist movements, the characteristics of radicalized individuals or the causes and individual processes of radicalisation. Another skill in which prison staff are widely trained in Europe is the detection of problematic signs of radicalisation in ordinary prisoners. Strikingly, a minority of the countries abovementioned devote a significant part of their training curricula to the rehabilitation and reintegration of extremist prisoners, including content related to motivational interviewing and sentence planning, for example. Ideologies addressed: Across Europe, prison staff are trained to manage prisoners linked to jihadist organizations such as Al Qaeda or Daesh. However, only a few countries also provide their staff with knowledge about other extremist movements, whether extreme right-wing, extreme left-wing or anarchism. Considerations like historical circumstances and the perceived risk associated with each type of violent extremist movement are key. Size of trained staff: It is difficult to estimate the proportion of European prison staff who have been trained on radicalisation and violent extremism, as many national prison systems do not collect or share this data. However, the very design of the training provision in each country suggests that there are large differences in access to training, and consequently in the number of staff qualified to address this challenge in prisons. While some countries offer online courses on P/CVE or have included mandatory content on these topics as part of the initial training for new staff joining the prison system, in others training is based on intermittent and ad hoc initiatives (often funded by EU research and innovation programmes). Why progress in P/CVE training for prison staff has been uneven across Europe? Insufficient learning objectives and uneven staff training ratios: these are two of the main deficits that European prison systems currently face in their response to the challenges of violent extremism. What explains this general situation and why are there such great contrasts between European countries? The degree of development of the training on offer, as well as its characteristics, depend on several key aspects. At least three help to understand the current state: The nature of the problem is key. The challenge posed by violent extremism in European prisons comes not only from prisoners convicted of terrorist offenses, but also from ordinary prisoners vulnerable to radicalization within prisons. Data collected by European experts reveal that, in most countries, the number of ordinary prisoners radicalized behind bars is equal or even higher than that of violent extremist offenders (see table below). By way of example, in France, the proportion of ordinary prisoners who have been radicalized in prison is 86% higher than that of individuals who entered prison after being convicted of terrorism; in Denmark, the former represents 120% more than the latter. This helps to understand why some European prison systems are more concerned with meeting the training needs arising from the management of inmates radicalized while serving their sentence and much less with addressing the needs arising from dealing with extremist offenders. This explains the emphasis of all training programmes on radicalisation awareness and recognition of signs of radicalisation, but also in part the limited focus on rehabilitating and reintegrating extremist prisoners within the training curricula. While it could be argued that both groups of inmates need to be reintegrated, the intervention with extremist prisoners is much more intensive in addressing the risk factors and the radical ideology underlying the crimes they have committed. Beyond the fact that prisoners vulnerable to radicalisation appear to be more numerous than extremist offenders, an important role is also played by the fact that prison professionals have different scope for action when carrying out tasks related to detection and rehabilitation. While they must apply risk and needs assessment tools across the board to all inmates who show indications of radicalisation, rehabilitation and reintegration programmes are only implemented with the (often few) inmates who voluntarily agree to participate in such interventions. Moreover, while validated and evaluated assessment tools exist at European level, and a considerable amount of theoretical and practical development is available for the training of professionals, rehabilitation and reintegration programmes are in an experimental phase in many countries, and their development is still based on a trial-and-error approach. The levels of prevalence of violent radicalisation in prisons differ markedly across Europe. Data from the World Prison Brief on the total prison population and from the most comprehensive and recent report on prison management of violent extremism in Europe reveal that, although violent extremist offenders represent an average of 0.6% of the prison population in the 10 countries, there is a large difference between those with the highest proportion of prisoners convicted of terrorism offenses (they are 1.6% of all prisoners in Sweden and 1.5% in Belgium) and those with the lowest proportion (in Italy they account for 0.1% of the total, and in Greece and Spain, 0.2%.) The level of prevalence of a phenomenon has a decisive impact in policy priorities and professionals’ incentives. As such, those countries that have a higher proportion of violent extremist offenders may find it more urgent to train their prison and probation staff in P/CVE. In addition, some European countries (e.g., France, Belgium, Austria, and the Netherlands) have experienced prison-related terrorist attacks, putting more direct pressure on their prison systems to address the risk of recidivism among these inmates. From another angle, first-line practitioners may perceive that other issues are more prevalent or have a higher incidence in prisons than violent extremism, which incentivises them to train in competences unrelated to the management of these inmates. The conditions of each national prison system also vary greatly in terms of resources and capabilities. Three aspects which have a significant impact on the planning and delivery of training are the number of professionals working in prisons, the capacity of the facilities and the size of the general prison population. As the day-to-day running of a prison is very demanding in terms of human resources, it is difficult for prison administrators to allocate working hours to training without affecting the running of the centres or taking resources away from the management of daily activities. For this reason, understaffed and overcrowded prison systems find it more difficult to meet the training needs of their professionals. The following table shows the current status of the 10 prison systems in relation to these three key factors: How to address the training gaps of prison and probation staff dealing with violent extremism? In coping with the challenges posed by violent extremism, European prison systems have prioritized detection over rehabilitation. While the attention paid to preventing and assessing the radicalisation of ordinary prisoners is appropriate and judicious, the response to inmates who enter prison after receiving a conviction for terrorism requires a greater impetus at all levels (at the ministerial level, at the level of the general penitentiary administration, and at the level of the penitentiary centers themselves). To reduce the risk of recidivism of violent extremist offenders and promote their rehabilitation and social reintegration, prison and probation professionals need to develop a wide range of competencies that involve prosocial modeling, cognitive restructuring, motivational interviewing and sentence planning, or more specific ones such as faith-based interventions. At the same time, prison professionals must be prepared to work with a diversity of extremist offenders, which requires a diversification of the ideologies addressed by current training programmes. In addition, access to specific training must be ensured to all professionals who require it. E-learning can also be used to address these objectives, since one of its advantages is that it maximizes the investment in training and facilitates access to it. With the support of EU programmes for research and innovation, European countries can fill the gaps in their current P/CVE training offers, as these projects provide an invaluable opportunity to explore cooperation relationships with different national and international relevant actors. In this regard, various initiatives funded by the European Commission in the past have contributed to reducing national disparities in the development and delivery of P/CVE capacity-building programmes by establishing benchmarks towards which countries can converge. The EUTEx project seeks to broaden the EU's response to violent extremism by focusing on one of the most pressing needs in its prison systems: the disengagement and reintegration of extremist inmates. Álvaro Vicente is analyst at the Elcano Royal Institute in Spain and has participated as a researcher in publicly and privately funded projects. He focuses on the management of jihadist extremism in Spanish prisons, the implementation of innovative trainings in prisons and the design of specialised training programmes for prison and probation staff.

Since the rise in the number of terrorist attacks in Europe in 2015, the threat of terrorist violence has received greater attention across the continent. Consequently, the Austrian probation service, NEUSTART, decided to place a much stronger focus on convicted terrorists and developed its own supervision guidelines. Since 2015 NEUSTART has taken care of 75 persons, who were sentenced based on the so-called "terrorism paragraph" (§ 278c Strafgesetzbuch (Austrian Criminal Law)). NEUSTART aims to ensure that the offender reintegrates into society with applicable values and takes control of his or her life with a new, positive perspective – and, most importantly, without engaging again in criminal activity. Since 2015, around 40 specialists have been trained to guide these persons. The training focuses on: dynamics of radicalization and threat management; providing basic knowledge on violent jihadist manifestations of Islam; risk assessment of radicalized persons; and social work practice in deradicalization work. Although the regional focus of this specific client group of convicted offenders is in Vienna, NEUSTART takes care of cases all over Austria and has specialists distributed in all Austrian regions. Who are the clients? The majority of clients under the care of NEUSTART are people who planned or attempted to leave Austria for terrorist purposes or who have committed criminal offenses, such as distributing violent jihadist material like videos or publications. The majority of clients were convicted on the charge of leading or being a member of a terrorist organization. However, people who were conditionally sentenced and released from prison are also among them. In the latter case, the best possible approach to ensure a functioning transition from prison to societal reintegration proved to be preparation by both the prison system and the probation service before release, since the immediate period after release is considered to be risky and decisive for the further development of the person (this process is regulated by a decree of the Directorate General for the Execution of Sentences). What are the priorities in care? Social work with radicalized and violent extremists at the probation service is part of the Austrian Strategy for the Prevention of Extremism and Deradicalization. NEUSTART contributes to the deradicalization process by providing long-term support to ensure sustainable disengagement from violent extremism. This process is implemented in close cooperation with other organizations that specialize, for example, in working with counter-narratives targeting violent interpretations of religion and worldviews (e.g. the NGO “DERAD” – www.derad.at). The main goal in this context is to positively change the attitudes of the clients through the sustainable development of viable alternative courses of action and perspectives. Important elements are: strengthening the positive social environment; ensuring support in securing livelihoods; clarifying residence status; working on self-image and identity; processing offenses; biographical work with a focus on key experiences and the radicalization process; as well as risk assessment. The following points are considered in the work with individuals to initiate this positive development: Develop sustainable positive alternatives to violence: reject violence as a means, develop non-violent alternatives and constructive conflict resolution strategies. Develop an understanding of the effects of problematic behavior on oneself and others. Distance oneself from a violent environment - learning to resist. Personal stabilization based on strengths and resources. Strengthen taking responsibility for one’s own actions. Better understand one's biography, key experiences, and the process of radicalization. Develop sustainable positive perspectives. Risk assessment and biography work In addition to a professional assessment and specific supervision, ongoing risk analysis plays an important role in these cases. The Austrian probation service uses the IT-based assessment tool VERA-2R which is designed to query all relevant topics so that potential "blind spots" in supervision can be kept to a minimum. For clients in the specific context of disengagement and deradicalization, the focus is particularly directed towards ideology in relation to the respective offense. Both the personal history of the individual (methods of biography and genogram analysis) and the factors of attraction to a radical ideology are of great relevance. The ultimate aim is that the person recognizes what subjective needs the connection to radical thoughts is supposed to satisfy and what alternative, constructive and, above all, legal and hence legitimate possibilities exist to satisfy these needs. Challenges This approach requires strong personal trust between the radicalized individual and the counselor, in which problematic developments, contents and situations come to light. However, the more these risk areas are known to the probation service, the more concretely it can be dealt with, and preventive countermeasures can be taken. The care of radicalized persons always treads a fine line: information on risk areas is essential to help with positive change and enhance risk reduction. At the same time, deradicalization and disengagement work regularly experiences setbacks leading to (self-)doubt, changing value systems, and fluctuating attitudes of the persons in care. The Austrian terrorist attack in 2020 and its consequences The terrorist attack on 2 November 2020 in Vienna was a major setback for NEUSTART. Nonetheless, it led to an immediate critical analysis of applied standards, and it became clear that cooperation and having security-relevant information at hand are crucial factors to recognize dangerous developments in advance in order to take necessary countermeasures. In the aftermath of the attack, an investigation commission (so-called “Zerbes Committee”, named after Ingeborg Zerbes, a professor of Criminal Law at the University of Vienna, who chaired the committee), appointed by the Austrian Federal Ministry of Justice and the Federal Ministry of the Interior examined the processes leading up to the attack. Despite the fact that improvements are always possible, the final investigation report produced by the committee did not contain any critique concerning the probation work of NEUSTART in the specific case of the attacker who was in the care of the Austrian probation service at the time of the attack. The committee proposed to review the processes leading up to the attack, which was ultimately reflected in the so-called "anti-terror package". This is a series of legal measures taken by the Austrian government to prevent similar incidents in the future. For example, such measures include conducting case conferences (“Fallkonferenzen”) which bring the main actors involved in the process of prison release and probation together systematically. The continuous development process at NEUSTART The critical analysis of the applied quality standards of care for the specific client group of radicalized individuals led to important further improvements in deradicalization and disengagement work. Current international developments, insights from research, and experiences gathered from international cooperation partners and networks were taken into account and resulted in expanded training offered to colleagues working at NEUSTART. The content of the practical work was also adapted through an increased focus on continuous, closer and constant care. In addition to this, it also proved important to expand specialized knowledge at a higher level of quality assurance by ensuring the vigorous application of a multi-eye principle to thoroughly analyze and jointly reflect on all cases. Internal review conferences and regular evaluations further highlight the challenges in this area and ensure continual process improvement. In the context of immediate care, a stronger focus is now placed on the analysis of social and family environments in addition to a content-related orientation as described above. Visits at the home of the respective person help to ensure a better understanding of the concrete living situation and consequently ensure better evaluation of the social environment and factor this into the risk analysis. Outlook Numerous positive steps were taken in the Austrian probation service to minimize the likelihood of the occurrence of similar and further terrorist attacks in Austria. It must be made clear, however, that there is no guarantee of this. All involved administrations and organizations are working together across disciplines to reduce the threat as much as possible. The goals of the EUTEx project – currently under implementation with funds from the European Union – are to develop a European framework for better reintegration and disengagement of extremist offenders (www.eutex.eu). NEUSTART participates in the project as an end-user and will make an important contribution in helping NEUSTART to further learn and adapt its current approaches if deemed fruitful. Spiros Papadopoulos has been working with the Austrian probation service NEUSTART since 2016. He is specialized in caring for released offenders sentenced due to terrorism-related offenses. Since 2020, he has managed the disassociation and exit project KOMPASS. Since 1.5 years he holds responsible for the coordination of the nation-wide deradicalization work of NEUSTART. He studied social work.

Against the background of ongoing digitalization of most facets of life, a crucial trend of the decade has been the transformation of entire industries into sharing economies. With the increasing role of social media, extremists have also adapted a sharing economy approach, which not only changed the underlying top-down structures towards decentralised networks, but also affected related research to a large extent by making many extremist activities more accessible. In fact, it is this major shift that makes social media intelligence (SOCMINT) possible in the context of (applied) extremism research. It is an avenue of research that presents both opportunities and challenges. Why social media intelligence? Until the last decade, one of the main methodological challenges of extremism research used to be the severe lack of empirical data; other than a few attempts at going undercover in these scenes, there were barely any viable methodologies to collect primary data on extremists. Court files are usually difficult to access, and scene members rarely agree to interviews. While some neo-Nazi and violent jihadi groups have shown a presence on online boards since the 1980s, online activities were mostly marginal before social media became sufficiently widespread in the late-2000s. However, the era of digitalization, largely taking off in the last decade, led to a new avenue for circumventing the issue of data collection to an extent. Fast-forward to 2022, a large chunk of extremists’ activities shifted to virtual spaces. Consequently, extremist groups increasingly rely on online supporters worldwide: propaganda is not exclusively produced by organized groups for end-users anymore, but also by individuals without an affiliation with the group. This sharing economy of extremism has not only changed scenes fundamentally and shaped new generations of extremists, but also resulted in a substantial surge in openly available extremist content. The benefits for researchers are straightforward: These circumstances offer a unique opportunity to collect primary data, which, in several cases, can even serve as crucial evidence in criminal proceedings, e.g. against foreign terrorist fighters. Social media intelligence’s goal is to collect such data and turn it into actionable insights, for instance by developing a better understanding of strategies, scenes, and trends, and improving prevention and de-radicalization programs. While SOCMINT in the age of the sharing economy of extremism is certainly not the sought-after panacea some may think it is, it can play a major part in advancing expertise in extremism. Navigating a legal gray zone and finding a balance When dealing with extremism in general, the single most important thing to do before engaging in any research activity is to explore the legal boundaries. While some countries have enacted additional clauses into the criminal offence of consuming or downloading extremist content, making an exception for academic purposes, it is still not a universal protection. Instead, it remains a gray zone which can lead to grave consequences. Hence, staying up-to-date on domestic and international legislation is crucial. Researchers might get caught up in covert investigations of security agencies, or simply get in trouble at airports or other scenarios where devices may be screened. In general, being affiliated with a research institute and/or having credentials in the field should be sufficient to avoid legal trouble, in combination with following the respective laws, including on the issues of informed consent and data protection. By the nature of extremism, research activities in this area bring up a number of additional legal and ethical questions, one of them being whether— and in which exact scenarios — to report extremist content and groups to authorities. Researchers often lack the legal knowledge and authority to decide whether specific content is protected by free speech, or is already punishable by law. This is made even harder by the extremists' tendency to hide behind memes, sarcasm, and humor. On the one hand, reporting might be the best and safest choice legally and morally to prevent violent content from spreading, to help authorities find and crack down on violent cells, and to cover one’s own legal responsibilities. On the other hand, that may result in losing sight of what is happening in the scene: frequent purges as a result of reports have been known to push groups to new, more exclusive platforms that are harder to monitor (including for authorities). Also, while crackdowns usually decrease the number of active members/followers, those that remain most usually become more radical due to the pressure and the perception of a shared threat to the in-group. As a rule of thumb, social workers are advised that the red line for reporting should be concrete evidence of impending violence or criminal activity. While the interpretation of “concrete evidence” has its own challenges too, it is better to tread on the side of caution. Establishing and maintaining access Finding and accessing the relevant platforms, channels, groups can take minutes or months, especially if language barriers exist. Less extreme sources are easier to find, as they mostly operate on mainstream platforms to broaden their reach and are thus fairly known. However, the deeper into the scene, the more extreme the content and the smaller the circle: as extremists’ communication and propaganda could result in criminal charges, it is increasingly difficult to find and access these sources, e.g., closed channels or private chat groups. Extremists have meanwhile adapted their modus operandi to contemporary surveillance strategies by using researchers’ own tactics against them: monitoring researchers’ social media accounts and research platforms for publications on online extremist activity, for the purpose of learning which extremist channels are being observed, and how. As a result, more and more extremists take additional measures and proactively provide operational security advice to their scenes to evade researchers and authorities. Oftentimes, one must go through vetting processes that vary in thoroughness to gain access. As a general recommendation, participating outside of office hours (also taking time zone differences into account) can help avoid raising suspicion of being a researcher or an authority. Other usual vetting methods range from asking for voice and/or video messages, the provision of other social media accounts for screening, to personal contact with local members. Documentation and purges: Hurdles and fixes The amount of information online can often be challenging to deal with, which is why establishing a sustainable system to document the data and keep track of developments is crucial, in particular for platforms that are often hit by purges. While there is no one-size-fits-all solution, algorithms and automatized scripts crawling platforms can be immensely helpful. Of course, this requires some technical expertise or buying software, and can result in undifferentiated extensive datasets that are hard to use. Depending on the objectives of the researcher, the alternative is manually managing the documentation (i.e., hand-picking messages, images, videos to save; adding keywords for later search queries). This, however, can be time-consuming: in a hypothetical scenario of monitoring 80 channels/users/chat groups on 4 different platforms with an average of 20-30 posts by each unit, monitoring and documentation can take hours every day. Hence, even when using specific software, one should always develop at least some kind of research design, defining a clear objective and research question that help tailor the approach. Mental health considerations and the way to a sustainable approach As an open source intelligence analyst with over 20 years of experience said, experts in this field “expose themselves a lot to all the horrors this world has to offer”. Monitoring extremist scenes inevitably means spending hours reading disturbing texts and seeing explicit material, which in turn can result in secondary traumatic stress (also called vicarious trauma). Despite learning how to take a step back from work, not even the coldest professionals can remain unaffected: “Being exposed to these amounts of traumatizing footage isn’t normal. This is not just work you can leave at the office once your shift is over.” The psychological impact might be further exacerbated by the necessity of engagement outside of office hours, which increases exposure. Yet despite these challenges, there are a number of steps one can take to deal with such difficulties: setting clear and pre-defined boundaries, proactively seeking professional counselling, and following good practices, such as taking regular breaks and only watching explicit footage in black and white, are essential parts of a sustainable approach. Concerns related to one’s own security can also add to the potential detrimental impact of this work on mental health. One, if not the most important measure to take is to protect one’s personal identity, for both the security and psychological well-being of the researcher. There is a very real risk of one’s identity being compromised, or the files shared on channels being malicious. The accounts used for monitoring will unavoidably be affected by algorithms, too: should one use private accounts for research purposes, the algorithm will keep feeding extremist content even outside working hours. In cases where the identity of SOCMINT experts becomes known, extremists tend to resort to online bullying or even death threats. However, in addition to setting up separate accounts, being aware of one’s own information/operational security should help avoid most issues. A recommended exercise for practitioners is to establish their personal threat model, and identify and mitigate risks. The future of SOCMINT in extremism research With human interactions increasingly shifting towards virtual settings (and an emerging metaverse), online spaces will no doubt continue to gain relevance, which in turn poses several challenges, also beyond what was described above. The younger generations will always be more tech-savvy — effortlessly — than those older than them. Combined with the acceleration of changes in the world, it will become increasingly difficult to keep up with youth trends and subcultures as well as technological innovations. On the positive side, there is now much more data available to researchers compared to 20 years ago, when most extremist activities took place behind closed doors, which helps make sense of the subject matter. Thanks to the continuous advances made in AI and software, several methodological difficulties will likely be sorted out, and trends could also be revealed on a larger scale with the help of big data. That, however, will require (currently unique) hybrid profiles for researchers, combining social sciences with technical expertise. Whether these prospects give us a reason to see the SOCMINT glass half empty or half full, remains contested. Erik Hacker is research fellow at SCENOR and an experienced researcher on violent extremism, terrorism and radicalization, especially on the web, its structures, dynamics and discourses. He holds an LL.M. of the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam in law and politics of international security and a BA in political science of the Universtiy of Vienna.

The recently convicted terrorist Khairi Saadallah referred to his triple murder by knife in a Reading park as the „jihad that I done“. Saadallah was a denied asylum seeker, with a history of crime, debt, homelessness and mental problems; his unstable behaviour and anti-social personality disorder were however not sufficient to substantiate a mental illness defence. Already back in the 80s, when terrorism studies were still in their infancy, clinical research on scores of left-wing terrorists in Germany decisively dismissed the “craziness” argument. In fact, eminent scholar Martha Crenshaw wrote in her 1981 piece “The Causes of Terrorism” with reference to psychopathology that “the outstanding common characteristic of terrorists is their normality”. Later research on Islamist terrorists reached similar conclusions. Initial arguments placing lack of integration or low socio-economic status at the core of violent jihadi radicalization processes in Europe eventually gave way to evidence displaying a high variety of socio-economic and demographic profiles. In some cases, it was high levels of education and income that distinguished terrorists, exemplary shown for example in the Glasgow airport attack of 2007 perpetrated by a doctor and an engineer; or in the book „Engineers of Jihad: The Curious Connection between Violent Extremism and Education“. This pattern of somewhat ordinary existences turning to terrorism seems to have fundamentally changed in Europe. Daesh brought the crime-terror nexus to the fore as illustrated by the infamous message „Sometimes people with the worst pasts create the best futures“. But this is not the whole story. An additional feature that seems dominant especially in non-Daesh attacks of recent years is mental illness. Overall, terrorists who have carried out attacks in Europe in recent years were often criminal, mentally disturbed, un- or underemployed, without perspectives, at times failed asylum seekers or former combatants, acting alone. While some claimed dedication to the cause, some did not, and their motivation to engage in violence seems to be of a rather personal nature. The 7/7 bombers’ ringleader of the attack in London in 2005 claimed in his video to aim at stopping the bombing, gassing, imprisonment and torture of ‘his people’. In the video of the Vienna killer of 2 November 2020, the political message was completely absent. From an individual perspective, much of jihadi terrorism in Europe is not fighting for a political cause anymore, but it is the loser’s redemption. Across Europe, roughly half of the individuals convicted for Islamist terrorist activity had previous criminal convictions. In our sample of 51 Daesh attacks in Europe between 2014 and 2021 there are 59% of perpetrators with criminal background, out of which 30% related to terrorism; in 53% of the cases the attackers were known to the authorities; out of the cases where information could be found in open-source data 33% were unemployed and only 11% had a white-collar job. 90% of these attacks involved a lone actor, and in 24% of the attacks there were mental health issues. In the sample of 20 non-Daesh attacks for the same period (one Al-Qaeda Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and the rest without affiliation), there is again a prevalence of 90% lone actor and 45% criminal background. 55% had mental issues. The Vienna attacker was on parole after a conviction for attempting to join Daesh. He had a marginal part-time job as security staff. The man who killed four people and injured six in a tram in Utrecht on 18 March 2019 was a drug addict, with a history of violence and debt, and about to be evicted from his home. In January this year, the ‘tram terrorist’ stabbed a guard in a Rotterdam prison in the face and neck. The Strasbourg attacker of 2018, who killed five and wounded 11 with a knife, was described as a hardened criminal, convicted for the first time at the age of 13 and with a total of 27 convictions from petty crime to robbery to drug dealing. Also in 2018, a man killed two female officers and a civilian in Liège while being on a one-day parole; before that he killed a former prison mate with a hammer. He was known for his violent behaviour and had convictions for robbery, assault and drug dealing. In 2017, a man stabbed and killed a person and injured six more in a supermarket in Hamburg. He was a failed asylum seeker with drug and psychological problems and about to be deported. Criminal history, precarious economic circumstances and mental illness alone already challenge established knowledge about the commonality of terrorist backgrounds. This, however, should not lead to the conclusion that poverty, mental illness or crime in any manner cause terrorism. The problems of this deterministic approach remain since it still holds true that the majority of individuals in these situations do not turn terrorists. From a strategic perspective, however, it is apparent how individuals with such backgrounds are the ideal pool for organizational recruitment strategies. The Daesh strategy for Europe does not involve conquering and managing territory or obtaining the support of the population. It is a strategy of provocation and attrition, in which context any action that creates chaos and insecurity, in essence, any act of indiscriminate violence will suffice. From this perspective, it is not important to be able to formally recruit, train and control members – mentally ill individuals are not a liability anymore. Daesh has encouraged the use of everyday objects such as knives or vehicles by virtually anyone. Such actions do not need to be planned in a complex manner or centrally coordinated. And the actor does not need to be particularly well versed in either ideology or warfare. Furthermore, Daesh purposely targeted criminals and painting a picture of joining Daesh as the “good life”. But there is something even more fundamentally different about many contemporary violent jihadis, namely the loose embedding in ideology and organizations, in some cases even a limited commitment to the political cause. Many attackers in recent years in Europe seem to lack strong affiliations with terrorist organizations and their motivation appears to relate more to individual circumstances rather than world politics. Only 50.7% of the 71 attacks in Europe between 2014 and 2021 were claimed by a terrorist organization. 22.5% were inspired by or otherwise linked to Daesh, while in 26.7% of the attacks no affiliation could be established. Individual biographies of terrorists often reveal short exposure to ideology, and a superficial uptake of essential ideological and/or religious content. For example the perpetrator of the vehicle ramming attack in Nice 2016 was found to have radicalized very rapidly. Anis Amri, a Tunisian who drove a truck into a crowd at a Christmas market in Berlin in December 2016 had ‘radicalized’ in an Italian prison and consumed drugs on a regular basis. The Vienna attacker of 2020 was assessed as having a rudimentary understanding of religion; according to his deradicalization advisor, he believed that all true Muslims’ prayers will be heard. He doubted himself and did not understand why he continued to be imprisoned in spite of his prayers. When deciding to blow up a London metro station in 2005, Mohammed Siddique Khan created a rudimentary video in which he stated the rationale for his deed. He described what he perceived as a situation of oppression demanding revenge and immediate restorative action. These political objectives or the political narrative has become very thin in recent years. It is as if the political utility of the terrorist act had lost in importance in the face of individual gain. Illustratively, the Strasbourg attacker is reported to have told other inmates that he was about to either commit a robbery or die as a martyr. Hence, these attacks were not so much about politics, but about oneself: personal redemption, gaining self-esteem, finding a way out, or going down with a blow when all other ways seem to be closed – constellations exacerbated by drug use and mental instability. This new brand of terrorism shows parallels to amok and suicide and has a high potential for replication. In fact, analysts characterized recent attacks as imitative waves. To illustrate: all 13 non-affiliated attacks between May 2018 and October 2020 were committed by stabbing. Also in the sample of Daesh-affiliated attacks we find patterns: the stabbing in London on 2 February 2020 was followed by a stabbing in France one day later; a stabbing in September 2019 in Milan was followed by another in October in Paris, and another in November in London; an attack by vehicle in France in August 2017 was followed by two in the same month in Spain. January and February 2016 also witnessed stabbings in France and Germany. A few days ago, on 24 April 2021, in an attack not yet claimed, a man stabbed to death a policewoman in the municipality of Rambouillet near Paris after watching jihadi martyrdom videos. His family described him as quiet and not particularly pious; he had been in psychiatric treatment. All 8 unclaimed attacks in 2020 were committed by stabbing. More importantly, it has become increasingly difficult to differentiate terrorism from amok and suicide. Consider the recent incident in Sweden, when an individual stabbed seven people, severely injuring them. Swedish authorities eventually categorized this incident as multiple attempted murder. Yet terrorism was briefly considered, based on the modus operandi which was similar to other attacks deemed terrorism. The assailant was known to the authorities, among others, for petty crimes. These developments indicate the need to look more closely at specific aspects of the radicalization process, like mental health or socialization in crime and their role therein. The psychological effects of the pandemic and the strategic orientation of specific terrorist propaganda will also need to be factored in. While basic radicalization mechanisms might be comparable across ideologies and time periods, such contextual factors can influence concrete motivations and types of actions. Mobilization to violence appears to increasingly occur in earlier stages of radicalization or as an outlet for personal problems. This increases the pool of potential terrorist attackers in the long run. More effort should thus be invested in primary and secondary prevention, including by involving relevant psychological and psychiatric expertise. Acknowledgement: the author thanks Erik Hacker for assisting with data collection. Dr Daniela Pisoiu is Senior Researcher at the Austrian Institute for International Affairs (oiip) and Lecturer at the University of Vienna. She is active in various working groups and in the Editorial Board of the Radicalization Awareness Network (RAN) and has been researching radicalization, terrorism and extremism in Europe for 17 years.

Specifically targeting youth for recruitment is increasingly becoming a key strategy of terrorist groups. Youth are easy to instrumentalize for criminal purposes due to their ability to escape suspicion. More importantly, however, they are easier to manipulate than adults and, once indoctrinated, can make for loyal foot soldiers furthering the groups’ agenda without asking too many questions.[1] Daesh in particular has been noted for its strategic prowess in attracting children and teenagers. To this end, the group has invested considerable resources into creating its own ‘jihadi cool’ subculture through flashy magazines and videogames promising excitement, fame and comradeship to young people[2]. Especially to socially and economically marginalized youth lacking a sense of belonging and perspective within mainstream society, this ‘jihadi cool’ branding may act as a strong attractor and point of entry from which further radicalization and indoctrination with the groups’ resentful ideology may be pursued by malicious actors. When working with youth on the basis of personal trust, your efforts in engaging vulnerable children and teenagers and providing them with a sense of self-worth, belonging and purpose may be key for preventing them from seeking achievement of such psycho-social values through engagement with terrorist groups. The present how-to guide sketches some activities suitable to equipping young people with the mental strength as well as cognitive and social capacities to resist the appeal of violent extremism, thereby fostering the resilience of your target group against radicalization and ensuring the wellbeing of your community. Planning your youth project Below some activities are sketched out intended to provide guidance. They are based on the author’s experience in project work, as well as a review of a number of already existing projects. Each section provides links to relevant projects from which you may take additional inspiration, though you are encouraged to design your project in a way most feasible and impactful for your target community. The following factors should inform your approach: Availability of resources – most of the activities suggested below do not require substantial material resources for their implementation; nonetheless, you should inform yourself about funding possibilities and draw up a budget plan for your project in order to determine your options. Needs of your target community – where do you see the greatest potential for action within your target community? Where do you see demand for youth engagement, and which types of action are perhaps already being covered by governmental or non-governmental actors? A good strategy to find out about the types of activities that might be most impactful is to partner with civil society or governmental organizations as well as local schools and consult with them. Your own expertise – you do not need to be a professional instrumentalist in order to lead a music ensemble or choir – but some knowledge of music certainly will have an impact on your credibility and the success of the project. If you want to implement a project in a field you are less knowledgeable about, you might consider recruiting volunteers or paid staff with specialized expertise. Expected size and composition of your group – none of the activities described below has an explicit limit in terms of membership. On the contrary, you should make sure no one with an interest in participating is excluded. However, a debate club or a theatre group may require a different design whether it has 5 or 30 members. Furthermore, for obvious reasons, the concrete contents of your project should be adapted to the average age and mix of gender and religious orientation among your participants. Legal framework – restrictions on the right to assembly, the right to association or freedom of speech may restrict your options. Ascertain that you do not act outside of what is legal so as to not put yourself or your protegees at risk. Religious Activities Purpose Being part of a healthy religious community is a highly effective way of bolstering resilience against radicalization in youth. Religion conveys meaning and purpose to life and provides children and adults with a caring and trusting environment where they can express their feelings safely. Furthermore, the religious community can provide youngsters with a positive interpretation of Islam that emphasizes forgiveness, peace and solidarity. Getting to know Islam as a religion of love rather than one of hate and revenge – as preached by violent jihadi hardliners – can strengthen young people’s resilience against the message of terrorists. If you host an inter-faith group, you allow youth to discover different faiths and develop tolerance and respect for each other’s religions. Requirements The program of a spiritual meeting group can be put to practice without a large budget but may be more diverse if you have access to financial resources. At a minimum, you will need a space for weekly meetings. If your budget is larger, you may make purchases such as catering and renting a venue for celebrations, transportation for excursions or hiring of guest speakers. Implementation The concrete contents of your program depend on budget and time constraints but also on the composition of your group. What is the average age of your participants? Do you host an inter-faith group or only Muslim youth? Activities with religiously oriented groups may include common praying and celebration of festivities as well as educational sessions. However, also non-religious activities such as community service, visiting landmarks or sites, sports or musical activities may be incorporated into the program. Project examples Race Equality First runs various interfaith group projects for young people at risk of radicalization. More info available at https://raceequalityfirst.org/past-projects/. Team Sports Purpose Sporting activities such as football, volleyball or hockey are an easy and uncostly way of socially engaging young people, thereby developing their sense for teamwork and collaboration, enhancing their self-confidence and personal satisfaction and conveying values such as fairness and tolerance. Especially for women and girls, engagement in sporting activities may defy the misconception that they are weak or incapable[3] and thereby provide a counter-narrative of the Salafi understanding of women as subservient to men. Requirements While specialized knowledge or skills are generally not necessary in order to organize and supervise sporting activities, practitioners should have some understanding of the rules and practices of the game. Additionally, practitioners should have basic medical training and be capable to perform first aid if needed. Organizing sporting activities does not require substantial resources either; proximity of athletic facilities or recreational areas are an advantage, but a makeshift football field can work just as well. Implementation Not much effort is needed for the implementation of team sports activities. Make sure everyone knows the rules of the game and establish resolution mechanisms in case rules are violated. In order to foster the team spirit of your protegees, you may organize social events for your sports team such as dinners or excursions. This enables you to bond with the team members, increase the cohesiveness of the group and will give you an avenue to learn about them and their problems. Project example The Athletic Club Jeunesse Molenbeek (ACJM) gives football training to boys and girls in Molenbeek, one of Brussel’s poorest neighbourhoods. More info available at https://www.acjm.be. Outdoor activities Purpose Resilience-building through outdoor activities, such as running, hiking, kayaking, cycling or camping can be especially enticing if your community is located close to a nature reserve or mountains. Outdoor activities can empower, allow youth to connect with nature as well as each other, and provide a sense of adventure and thrill. Requirements As outdoor activities may come with a risk of injury, you should be able to provide basic medical assistance. You should furthermore be familiar with the area in which you organize your activity, and ideally with the activity itself. Depending on the choice of activity, you should ensure that required resources (tents, bicycles, running shoes, transportation etc) are available to all participants. Implementation The way you execute the project depends on the activity you choose. Inform yourself about outdoor activities in your area and consult with your protegees when designing a program. Project example Free-to-Run organizes outdoor sports activities for women and girls in Afghanistan and Iraq. More info available at https://freetorun.org. Musical activities Purpose The therapeutic effect of music in overcoming trauma and giving value and meaning to life is well established.[4] Listening to and making music, for example, provenly yields neurological gains such as improvement of one’s cognitive abilities as well as decreased depression and stress levels (Harvard Medical School 2011). Moreover, being part of collaborative musical arrangement has shown to bolster social skills such as patience, cooperation and empathy.[5] Requirements The resources required for a music-based project will depend on the type of musical collaboration envisioned, which in turn depends on the cultural context in which you operate. At a minimum, you will need a space where you can practice with your group at least an hour a week, and a venue to publicly perform your pieces. Classical instruments are usually not only expensive, but also require substantial time and commitment to learn. Traditional instruments or vocal ensembles might present more viable options. Depending on the average age of your group, you will furthermore need at least basic musical training in order to lead your music group. Implementation In order to ensure that your musical project is successful, it is important to formulate realistic goals. You may encourage your group to at least take part in the decision of what to train and perform. However, make sure that their decision is in line with their skill level. Otherwise, failure to achieve desired results may lead to frustration. Project example Aloud charity, based in Wales, UK, offers singing rehearsals for youth and organizes performances and recording sessions. More info available at https://www.hodgefoundation.org.uk/cause/aloud-charity/. Literary Club Purpose A literary club may involve reading and discussing various literary texts as well as composing and reading out own poems or stories. Literature is a means of expressing feelings and communicating across cultural boundaries, can deliver positive messages such as love, solidarity and mutual respect and train critical thinking skills. Requirements Apart from a place where youth can feel safe to express their feelings and ideas and consume books or printouts, no specific resources or expertise are needed. Implementation Decide on literary texts beforehand and familiarize yourself with them in order to be able to guide and structure the discussion. You may propose texts from different cultural traditions in order to broaden the horizon of your protegees and open their minds. Respect each of your member’s interpretation of literary texts and encourage them to debate different ideas. You may also organize ‘open mic’ evenings, where your protegees can recite poems or tell stories in public. Furthermore, you can invite guests, for example writers, poets or literature students, to educate your group about literary theory and practice. Project example Children’s Literary Club (CLC) hosts various reading workshops across Karnataka, India, targeting disadvantaged youth in particular. More info available at http://www.childrensliteraryclub.org/index.html. Theatre Group Purpose Theatrical performance is an age-old medium for communicating not only emotional contents, but also discussing social and political ills. Therefore, apart from the general benefits of being part of a team with a shared goal, the special value of performative arts is that it gives young adults a voice to address injustices artistically and thereby convey a sense of agency. Requirements Although the availability of props, costumes and a proper stage may increase the quality of theatrical performance, a theatre group can easily subsist on a low-budget basis. You will merely need to organize a space for weekly practice and a venue to perform your pieces, as well as drama resource books and play scripts. Be aware that for some productions, you will have to get a license. Some knowledge in drama theory and performative arts will furthermore help you with your project implementation If you lack training in the performative arts, you might want to look out for a local drama teacher to assist you. Implementation Depending on the age and interests of your theatre members, you may draw up a syllabus that suits you best. For example, improvisation and games could be combined with choreography and performance. If you plan to eventually perform on stage, source out age-appropriate material that fits the size of your group and your budget. Lazy Bee Scripts, for example, has a large free collection of scripts for youth theatres. Project example Pan is a UK-based intercultural arts organization that implements drama projects for youth at risk of social exclusion. More info available at https://www.pan-arts.net/what-we-do. Debate Club Purpose Within the framework of a debate club, youngsters can train their oratory skills, develop their critical thinking capabilities and educate themselves on socio-political issues. Furthermore, debating as an integral part of civic education inculcates tolerance and respect for others who think differently. Requirements Apart from a space for weekly meetings, pencils, paper and a timer, no resources or expertise are required. Implementation There are various possible formats for debate clubs. You should consider the age of your participants and the size of the group when deciding on a design. www.csun.edu, for example, provides a list of debating formats from which you can conveniently choose the most suitable one for your purposes. If you want to increase the educational dimension of the project, you may include theoretical modules in civic education into the program, especially when politics courses are not provided for by the official schooling system. In many countries, debating competitions for young people are staged on local and national levels, which may provide your group with additional ambition and motivation. Project example Toastmasters International is a public speaking club the convenes in various countries. Further information at https://www.toastmasters.org/ Community Service Purpose Community service, or voluntarism, refers to non-obligatory, unpaid work that is carried out for the benefit of others. Voluntarism unites people from different backgrounds behind a common goal and is based on trustworthiness and reciprocity, therefore serving to foster social solidarity within communities as a whole. The individual benefits of voluntary community service include the training of leadership skills and conveyance of a sense of agency to addressing injustices and help the community. Requirements Apart from a space where you can meet up with the group in order to plan their activities and discuss their experiences and transportation if necessary, no substantial resources are required. Depending on the activity planned, you may also have minor expenses, for example for paint or trash bags. If you do have access to a larger budget, you may provide small rewards such as shared dinners, T-shirts or other gifts for your protegees. Implementation First and foremost an objective worth pursuing has to be decided on. There are vast possibilities usually concerning ecological (environmental clean-ups and trash collection, care for street animals, planting, renovating or paining public areas) or social topics (helping the old or handicapped with everyday chores, taking care of the homeless, assisting refugees). In order to choose a worthwhile objective, the organizer of a volunteering group should inquire what the needs of a community are and if those needs are already (and sufficiently) addressed by public bodies. Also, the age of your protegees should be considered; younger participants should not be given tasks placing too much responsibility on them, and activities should be carried out in such way that youth are under constant supervision. Once an objective is decided on, you will need to secure the approval and support of the local administration and coordinate with those institutions already engaged in the sector in which you want to invest your efforts. This will also help you to investigate potential liabilities and complications that may arise. Before you launch the project, draw up a plan on what your goal, strategy and distribution of roles is. Plan a briefing and de-briefing before and after each meeting and allow your protegees to reflect on their achievements and motivate them. Project example Urban ArtWorks, based in Seattle, US, works with youth on public art projects on a voluntary basis. More info available at https://urbanartworks.org. Anne Heckendorff works as a Research Analyst for the European Foundation for South Asian Studies (EFSAS). She has received her bachelor degree in International Law from Tilburg University, and a master degree in Conflict Studies from Utrecht University. Her research focusses on human rights, conflict resolution and terrorism in South and Southeast Asia. [1] Sunde, H.M. et al (2020). A Cultural Criminology of ‘New’ Jihad: Insights from Propaganda Magazines. Crime, Media, Culture: an international journal. [2] Sunde, H.M. et al (2020) – see footnote 1 [3] Puri, L 2016. The Value of Hosting Mega Sports Events as a Social, Economic and Environmental Sustainable Development Tool. 16 February 2016, New York [4] Forgeard, M.J.C, 2013. Perceiving benefits After Adversity: the Relationship between Self-Reported Posttraumatic Growth and Creativity. Aesthetics, Creativity and the Arts 7(3), pp 245-264 [5] Parziani, D., 2011. Orchestral conducting as educational practice: A Smallian perspective of relationships and pedagogy in youth orchestras. Approaches: Music therapy & Special Music Education, 3(2), pp.82-88.